The co-op link was authenticated (HMAC token, never sent over the wire)
but not encrypted. The hub now generates a self-signed cert on first run;
the peer pins its exact fingerprint (no CA involved — there isn't one for
a Tailscale/LAN address), delivered via a single invite-code paste that
also carries the token, replacing today's separate IP+token copy.
The peer link moves to its own TLS-only port (peer_listen, 47823) so the
plain overlay/panel port (47822, OBS-facing) never needs to be exposed
alongside it — today, opening the overlay port to a remote partner also
exposes /deaths and the panel to anyone.
Mandatory pinning, no insecure fallback: a half-configured peer (some but
not all of hub/token/fingerprint, or a broken invite) fails loudly at
startup rather than connecting unpinned. An unconfigured peer still runs
fine as a local-only overlay, same as before.
New: tlscert.go (cert generation/persistence), pin.go (fingerprint
pinning), invite.go (invite-code encode/decode, host auto-detection),
each with tests. main.go/config.go/duo.go/ws.go carry the wiring for
this — the dual listener, new config keys, and the TLS-aware WebSocket
dial — and were rewritten in English in the process, per the project's
new English-only code convention (see CLAUDE.md).
